A security wrapper for MCP servers that provides trust-on-first-use pinning.
mcp-context-protector
Overview
mcp-context-protector is a security wrapper for MCP servers that addresses risks associated with running untrusted MCP servers, including line jumping, unexpected server configuration changes, and other prompt injection attacks. Implementing these security controls through a wrapper (rather than through a scanner that runs before a tool is installed or by adding security features to an MCP host app) streamlines enforcement and ensures universal compatibility with all MCP apps.
Features
- Trust-on-first-use pinning of server configurations
- Automatic blocking of unapproved configuration changes
- Guardrail scanning and quarantining of tool responses
- ANSI control character sanitization
- Assisted editing of
mcp.jsonfiles
Quickstart
Installation:
# Install uv
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
# Download mcp-context-protector
git clone https://github.com/trailofbits/mcp-context-protector
# Install dependencies
cd mcp-context-protector
uv sync
To make it easier to launch mcp-context-protector, we recommend updating mcp-context-protector.sh to contain the full path to uv. Some MCP clients, including Claude Desktop, replace the PATH environment variable with a minimal set of paths when launching MCP servers, which can make your claude_desktop_config.json file unwieldy and hard to maintain. Including a full path to uv in the launcher helps mitigate this problem.
Now configure your client to run your MCP servers through mcp-context-protector, and tool configuration pinning will automatically be enabled. Here's a sample Claude Desktop config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"wrapped_acme_server": {
"command": "/path/to/mcp-context-protector/mcp-context-protector.sh",
"args": ["--command", "/path/to/node /path/to/acme/server.js"]
}
}
}
Alternatively, use --command-args to have mcp-context-protector concatenate all arguments that follow into one command string:
{
"mcpServers": {
"wrapped_acme_server": {
"command": "/path/to/mcp-context-protector/mcp-context-protector.sh",
"args": ["--command-args", "/path/to/node", "/path/to/acme/server.js", "--acme-enhanced"]
}
}
}
TL;DR: use --command-args if your MCP client mangles your stdio server command, but be careful with escaping of shell metacharacters.
Longer explanation: Some clients (including, as of this writing, Cursor) will construct their MCP server commands by concatenating the arguments together into a space-delimited string. That is, mcp-context-protector.sh --command "cmd arg1 arg2 --arg3" will become mcp-context-protector.sh --command cmd arg1 arg2 --arg3, and mcp-context-protector will think arg1 through --arg3 are meant as arguments to the wrapper, not to the child command. The --command-args option addresses this issue.
Security risks and controls
| Risk | Relevant control |
|---|---|
| Line jumping | Server configuration blocking, approval and pinning; guardrail evaluation of server instructions and tool descriptions |
| Server configuration changes/rug pulls | Server configuration pinning |
| User deception through ANSI control characters | ANSI control character sanitization |
| Other prompt injection attacks | Tool response guardrails and quarantining |
Server configuration pinning
mcp-context-protector uses a trust-on-first use pinning system for MCP server configurations. Any deviation from the approved/known-good server configuration will block downstream tool calls until the user explicitly approves the changed server configuration. Server approval is handled through mcp-context-protector's command-line interface.
Server configuration comparisons compare server instructions, tool descriptions, and tool input schemas to determine whether a server configuration is equivalent to any approved one. Comparisons are semantic and ignore irrelevant factors like tool order and parameter order.
The database of server configurations is stored in a JSON-encoded file whose default location is ~/.mcp-context-protector/servers.json. If a server configuration is in that file, it's approved and will run without tool blocking and without requiring user approval. The wrapper server checks downstream server configurations as soon as the connection is initiated and again whenever the wrapper receives a notification that the downstream server's tools have changed (notifications/tools/list_changed).
Servers are uniquely identified in this file by their type and an identifier, which is either a URL or the command string that launches the server. mcp-context-protector does not care about changes to a server's name in the host app's configuration (such as the claude_desktop_config.json file). If the command string (or URL) is unchanged, it's treated as the same server, and if the command string has changed, even in inconsequential ways, it's treated as a different
Configuration
{
"mcpServers": {
"wrapped_acme_server": {
"command": "/path/to/mcp-context-protector/mcp-context-protector.sh",
"args": ["--command", "/path/to/node /path/to/acme/server.js"]
}
}
}